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break with the Federalists of Massachusetts, he wrote in a short autobiographical sketch, "I discharged my duty to my country, but I committed the unpardonable sin against *Party*." Yet in almost the same breath he remarked, with a flash of self-scrutiny, "Perhaps I have too much indulged the suggestions of my own judgment, and paid too little deference to that of other men." The future biographer of Adams will hardly venture to deny this soft impeachment.

The work of the editor has been on the whole well done, although it seems at times less complete than in the earlier volumes. Here and there references to events are suffered to go without explanation. A reference, for example, to the "cause for which I came here", in a letter from Washington, March 5, 1809, can be made intelligible, of course, by turning to the *Memoirs*; but the casual reader perhaps will not know that this was the important case of *Fletcher v. Peck*, in which Adams appeared as counsel for the defendant. So, too, an allusion to the decision of Judge Davis in the district court at Salem in 1809 deserves a brief foot-note, for the case was an important test of the constitutionality of the embargo. Two slight errors have been noted. The editor prints *Porte Folio* as a single word, though neither Adams nor the editor of the periodical did so. Breckenridger (p. 159) is an obvious slip for Breckenridge.

ALLEN JOHNSON.

Bull Run: its Strategy and Tactics. By R. M. JOHNSTON. (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1913. Pp. xiv, 293.)

IF it is well to resurrect the story of the Bull Run campaign, then we must bear witness that this book gives a good narrative of events as they occurred; that the account has been verified by a study of the ground, that well-known sources of information have been consulted, and that conflicting stories have been fairly decided.

But Bull Run races will probably not be run again, and the event loses much of its interest as it ceases to be a lesson. Its three months' volunteers will parade no more upon the page of American history to furnish examples of panic rout, vain sacrifice, and the frivolity of the armed crowd. In the art of command from high to low, never again shall we see the unhappy tactics of Sherman and Heintzelman or the empty orders of McDowell and Beauregard. Our volunteer army bill has changed the one, and lieutenants are now so well dosed with the subject of military orders and the attack over open ground, that it has been feared that they know too much, not too little.

However if we must draw these shadows from their long repose we should bear in mind the wisdom of our later day. When we summon the soldiers of 1861 to appear before the bar of history let us take account of the state of military art as it was known to them. Let us give to McDowell and Beauregard a chance to reply that Napoleon the Great

at Wagram, at Auerstädt, at Ligny or Charleroi could be convicted of the same faults. The criticism of the author might be more gentle.

It is good practice for writers on strategy and tactics to define their meaning for these much-abused terms. The campaign abounds with curious if obsolete questions of tactics and strategy, not always stated as such, but hidden in the mass of narrative. The word tactics is not often used and further elucidation would be interesting in such matters as these: When artillery was used in "searching" woods and positions, apparently with approval of the author; something might be added to the discussion of the tactics of attack and defense when we know from the author's figures that McDowell crossed Bull Run with enough men to line the Warrenton pike from Stone Bridge to Dogan's house at six to the yard, and Beauregard had enough men in action to stand at nine to the yard from Robinson's to Henry's and on to Chinn's; and what of the position of Jackson on the reverse slope of the fire-swept zone, not on the military crest—a tactical expedient often noticed in this war, and quite opposed to theory; the field of fire of the Federal guns on Henry Hill; the negative results of superior artillery (regulars) against "Shanks" Evans's smooth-bores; the effect of Imboden's smooth-bores at Henry Hill. The author uses the word "strategy" with frequency, and thereby adds to our curiosity, for it is a recent word, not over seventy years old in our language, not used in its French form by Napoleon himself but greatly overworked by his commentators. Perhaps the best idea comes from Kipling's statement, "The essence of strategy is forethought." Under such a view, however, the book would condemn as "weak in strategy" the leader who shows its best example. When the North had 80,000 men available in West Virginia and Virginia, and the South had less than half that number, it would appear to be strategy to concentrate a superior Southern force against the largest Federal fraction. The plan seems to have belonged to Beauregard more than to any other.

With strategy as our theme we miss a strategic study of the frontier and a discussion of the influence of localities (capitals). If McDowell had used forethought he would not have put in front the troops which had the shortest march to make; he would have made crossings over the insignificant Cub Run, instead of marching 18,000 men over the narrow defile at the bridge, behind which he passed two whole days; he would have foreseen that 12,000 men marching on a country road at one man to the yard would take hours to form for attack.

Among brilliant reviews of *Bull Run* is one which has not been noticed by the author. Colonel John S. Mosby in the *New York Sun* reminds us that Ashby's cavalry joined from the valley on the day after the battle, making say 25,000 cavalry; that the cavalry was sufficient to have completely demoralized the retreat, crossed at Seneca Ford, fifteen miles from Washington, and cut it off from the north. Colonel Mosby contends that McDowell's order was what the Southern generals were

praying for, and did not take advantage of when they found it had been issued; that at 4:00 p. m. the Southern generals were six miles nearer Washington than the beaten armies of the North.

The author anticipates the development of field intrenchments when he charges Beauregard with neglect to do what Lee did not do at Antietam.

Some carelessness is shown in omitting scales and compass bearings from some maps and in such statements as that "Arlington was the property of Robert E. Lee", and the remark and foot-note on page 93 from which it would appear that Major Palmer commanded a battalion of cavalry consisting of sixteen squadrons, each squadron of half a company. Palmer commanded two squadrons, and bivouacked at Centerville on the night of July 21. Bull Run is referred to as a river.

EBEN SWIFT.

The United States Federal Internal Tax History from 1861 to 1871.

By HARRY EDWIN SMITH, Ph.D. [Hart, Schaffner, and Marx Prize Essays.] (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1914. Pp. xix, 357.)

To this book was awarded the first prize presented by Messrs. Hart, Schaffner, and Marx for the year 1912. It is a very valuable contribution to our economic history. It contains the best history of the income tax legislation during our Civil War that has hitherto been published. This is high praise, since the subject had been previously treated by Professor Seligman. The author (at p. 87) joins issue, with apparent success, upon the latter's statement that the repeal of the income tax was defeated in the Forty-First Congress by the vote of 105 to 104 (Seligman's *Income Tax*, first ed., p. 467).

In the book are also to be found the Congressional, administrative, and judicial histories of the inheritance tax, the tax on the gross receipts of corporations, bank taxes, stamp taxes, license taxes, liquor taxes, taxes upon manufactures, and other internal revenue taxes during the same period. It shows research not only through the *Congressional Globe* and Congressional documents, but also in the records of the departments and the files of the leading New York newspapers. It also explains many of the rulings by the commissioner of internal revenue, which are of importance not only as the practical construction of the statutes, but also as showing the reasons for some of the subsequent amendments. Annexed is a valuable series of tables, collected from Executive and Congressional documents, which are not easily accessible. No one, whether scholar or statesman, upon whom is imposed the duty of investigating any of these or cognate subjects, can afford to overlook the book.

The style is drier than the exigencies of the subject require. The work contains a number of awkward expressions, such as are unfor-